Abstract: Understanding international differences in the emissions intensity of trade and production is essential to understanding the effects of greenhouse gas limitation policies. We develop data on emissions from 48 industrial sectors in 32 countries and estimate the CO 2 emissions intensity of production and trade. We find no evidence that developing countries specialize in emissions-intensive sectors; instead, emissions intensities differ systematically across countries because of differences in production techniques. Northern and Western European countries have the lowest emissions-intensity, while Southern and Eastern European countries and China have the highest emissions-intensity. Developed countries such as Japan and the United States whose trading partners are mostly developing countries import the most emissions. 
International Differences in Emissions Intensity and Emissions Content of Global Trade

1) Introduction
Policies that are designed to limit anthropogenic global climate change must limit greenhouse gas emissions, particularly carbon dioxide (CO 2 ). Although the global CO 2 sink is more or less a commons today, current and future international agreements designed to limit CO 2 emissions are expected to incorporate some form of cap-and-trade mechanism that will cause emissions to carry a price. The impact of a carbon dioxide price on trade, and therefore on the nature and distribution of industry worldwide, is an open question whose answer will largely determine the distribution of gains and losses from any international agreement to limit carbon dioxide. It may also determine the agreement's prospects for success, as participation in international agreements is voluntary.
Before any reasonably accurate assessment can be made of the global impact of carbon dioxide emissions pricing on trade and industry, at least two questions must be addressed. First, which countries currently take greatest advantage of the global commons; that is, which countries' production and trade is most emissions-intensive?
Countries whose exports embody the most emissions will presumably feel the greatest impact to their industrial base from the enclosure of this global commons, but countries whose imports are most emissions-intensive will also feel an impact on their real income.
Second, and more fundamentally, what determines the emissions-intensity of production?
If a country's industrial emissions-intensity is primarily a function of the industrial sectors in which it specializes, we would expect the cost burden from emissions pricing to fall primarily on emissions-intensive sectors and the countries ("pollution havens") that specialize in them. If, on the other hand, emissions-intensity is a function of production techniques, we would expect a wider distribution of the burden, and perhaps a lighter overall burden, as emissions pricing would speed the adoption of less-intensive technologies through every industry.
In this paper we employ the tools of the empirical trade literature to address both questions. First, we address the question of the determinants of emissions-intensity by comparing the results of two models of trade. The Hecksher-Olin-Vanek (HOV) model explains the distribution of net exports by reference to factor endowments, holding production technique constant worldwide within any given sector. The HOV model modified in accordance with the Dornbusch-Fischer-Samuelson (1980) , or DFS, model (Davis and Weinstein, 2001) performs the same task, but allows techniques within an industry to vary across countries. Because the DFS model relaxes the assumptions of identical techniques and factor price equalization (FPE) in the standard HOV model, it is better able to predict international differences in emissions-intensity of trade that are driven by international differences in production techniques. We show that the DFS model's predictions are both very different from, and superior to, those of the HOV model, and conclude that international differences in production techniques, not sectoral specialization, explain international differences in emissions intensities.
We then use our emissions-intensity estimates to measure the current distribution of emissions-intensive production and trade among the 32 countries in our data set. We find evidence of an inverse relationship between level of development and the emissionsintensity of production, with some outliers. Northern and Western European countries have the lowest emissions-intensity, while Southern and Eastern European countries and China have the highest emissions-intensity. Because of the size of its trade deficit the United States imports the most emissions, although its imports are found to be less emissions-intensive than its own products. We also find that Western and Northern European countries import from less emissions-intensive (neighboring) countries while East Asian, Pacific, and North American countries import from more emissions-intensive countries.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe our data set and our method for allocating emissions among the ISIC industrial sectors used in the inputoutput tables. In section 3 we examine the data on emissions intensity by industrial sector and country, and we analyze the relationships between emissions-intensity and capital-intensity, and between emissions-intensity and total factor productivity. In section 4 we develop alternative empirical models of emissions content of trade and evaluate their predictive power. Section 5 concludes.
2) Data and Emissions Technology
To estimate the emissions content of international trade, we require data on production techniques and bilateral trade by country and by industry. We concentrate on CO 2 emissions, which constitute 77% of all greenhouse gases according to the World Resources Institute. We focus on industrial production rather than household consumption and transportation because we are interested in measuring emissions content of trade. Our data set consists of observations from 32 countries 1 Unfortunately, the industrial sector definitions used by the CRF are different from the ISIC Rev. 3 classifications used by the OECD Input-Output database. In fact, emissions data using an industry classification system consistent with our production data are simply unavailable for most countries. Even among the countries that provide such data, the definitions of allocation methodology in emissions and industry classifications differ from country to country. For example, Japan, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States provide industry-level emissions data, but differ as to how they allocate emissions resulting from electricity production and consumption. Turner, Lenzen, Wiedmann, and Barrrett (2007) and Wiedmann, Lenzen, Turner, and Barrrett (2007) provide a comprehensive review of data and estimation methodology. Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, the Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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Details of classification definitions can be found at http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/gl/invs1.html. Some previous studies (e.g., Lucas, Wheeler, and Hettige, 1992; Levinson, 2009) have gotten around the problem of matching emissions to industries in different countries by estimating emissions requirements for industries in a single country (typically the United States) for which data were available, and assuming that industry-specific emissions requirements were identical in all countries. This assumption of identical production techniques imposes a strong restriction, and if that restriction is incorrect it will bias the results. For example, it implies that not only U.S. exports but also U.S.
imports from other countries employ the same techniques and therefore have the same emissions-intensity. One of the contributions of the current paper is the relaxation of this assumption in order to allow different emissions requirements for each country and industry. To accurately identify different production techniques in different countries requires a method for constructing consistent and accurate emissions data by industry for each country. We use a method similar to Ahmad and Wyckoff (2003) to incorporate emissions from industrial sectors identified in the WRI/CRF data into industrial sectors identified in the OECD Input-Output data base. 3 Details of our method are described in the data appendix.
Validation of Industry-Specific CO 2 Emissions Estimates
We checked the validity of our emissions allocation methods by comparing them with available official allocations obtained by national governments using survey methods. In particular, Japan and Norway provide official data on CO 2 emissions by industry suitable for this purpose. In Japan, the "Law Concerning the Promotion of the Measures to Cope with Global Warming" went into effect in 1998, following the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. As a result, the CO 2 emissions data from 14,227 business units and 1,439 transport businesses became available for the public. Since the Japanese government provides CO 2 emissions by industry for the year 2006, we compare them with our predictions 4 by using the I-O table from 2006. We find our predictions work well for Japan. The across-industry correlation between actual CO 2 emissions and 3 Ahmad and Wyckoff studied the CO 2 content of trade for non-service industries from 13 aggregated industries for 24 countries, and developed their estimates of emissions techniques from IEA data. 4 See equation (A-6) in the data appendix A. predicted emissions is 0.792. Moreover, if we divide emissions by the corresponding industry's output (national currency basis) to obtain emissions intensity figures, the correlation of emissions intensities increases to 0.926. As shown in figure 1-1, "nonmetallic mineral products" and "iron and steel" are the two most emissions-intensive sectors in Japan, and our methodology precisely predicts these across-industry characters of emissions.
The Norwegian Economic and Environment Accounts (NOREEA) Project published industry-level data on CO 2 emissions for the year 2001. 5 While the environmental accounts follow the NACE version 1 industry classification, there are several differences between these environmental accounts and the official emissions data that follow the IPCC's common reporting framework (CRF). For example, since the environmental accounts use the national accounts definition of Norwegian activity and not a geographical definition of Norwegian territory, ocean transport and international air transport are included. 6 In addition, CO 2 emissions from transportation are included in corresponding sectors. By adjusting for these differences, the across-industry correlation between official Norwegian CO 2 emissions and predictions from our methodology is 0.783. Once we divide them by corresponding industry's output, the correlation decreases to 0.714. Even though these correlations are derived due to high emissions intensities for transportation sectors, our methodology predicts the across-industry variations in emissions for Norway accurately, as shown in figure 1-2.
Overview of the Country-Level Data
We present a summary of our CO 2 emissions data from 32 countries and 48 industries for the year 2000 in table 1. Energy and industrial CO 2 emissions for each country are provided in the sixth column "total (1.+2.)" of table 1. Total emissions from these 32 countries are 17,530 million tons, or 72% of total world emissions according to WRI (2008) . Of the 32 countries whose emissions we consider, China and the United States are by far the largest emitters of CO 2 : China emits 27.4% of the 32-country total 5 See http://www.ssb.no/nrmiljo_en/arkiv/tab-2004-03-29-02-en.html. Detailed methodology is reported in Hass, Sorensen and Erlandsen (2002). 6 Total emissions based on national accounts are 56,493 kt, while the IPCC CRF emissions are 40,000 kt. and the U.S. emits 24.6%. The rest of the columns in table 1 summarize the national data on CO 2 emissions used for our estimates. Since we are interested in production sectors, our estimates of CO 2 emissions do not include emissions generated from households' electricity and heat consumption or transportation.
Emissions from electricity and heat production from industrial sectors account for 30% of total emissions. The proportion of electricity and heat in national CO 2 emissions varies widely across countries, depending chiefly on the characteristics of electricity generation plants. For example, according to EIA (2008) , electricity production accounts for only 4% of total CO 2 emissions for Switzerland, which generates 55% of its power from hydro plants, purchases much of the rest from France, and only produces 2% from fossil fuels. Similarly, electricity generation produces only 9.9% of total CO 2 for France (79% nuclear-powered). At the other extreme, electricity generation accounts for 50% of emissions in India, where the fossil-fuel share of electric power production is 81% (75% coal-fired). Similarly, Australia and Poland rely on fossil fuels for 92% and 97%, respectively, of their electricity production; again, the primary fuel in those countries is coal and the electricity sector accounts for more than 40% of total emissions in each case.
Overall emissions from industrial activities account for 62% of total emissions in the countries we consider. They account for a substantial proportion in all countries, but the exact proportion is quite variable, ranging from 42.7% of total emissions in Switzerland to 88.6% in China. This variation across countries is observed because of cross-country variation in factors such as capital-shares in production, emissions from transportation, size of the manufacturing sector, and modes of power generation.
3) Productivity, Capital Intensity, and Emissions Requirements
Figure 2-1 is a scattergram of the association between the total factor productivity (TFP) index 7 and emissions intensity, measured as total industrial CO 2 emissions divided by real GDP. We find a clear decline in emissions intensity as TFP increases. A high-TFP country requires less physical capital and labor per unit of production than a low-TFP country does, so a developed country tends to emit less CO 2 per unit of production.
The least efficient country in terms of TFP indices, China, employs relatively highemissions techniques as well. The United States has the world's highest TFP and displays a moderate level of emissions-intensity, but most European countries use much cleaner techniques than the United States does. High-side outliers include Poland, with 70% of fossil fuel emissions from coal, China (82%), the Czech Republic (60%), and the Slovak Republic (41%), whereas low-side outliers include Argentina (1%), Switzerland (1%), Brazil (11%), and Sweden (16%).
Because capital-intensity is correlated with income, these results weakly support the 7 We first calculate the multilateral TFP index of Caves, Christensen, and Diewert (1982) . The multilateral TFP index is defined as
where C is the number of countries in the dataset, Y c is real value added for country c, L c is country c's labor force, K c is its physical capital, and σ c is its labor-compensation share.
environmental Kuznets inverse-U hypothesis discussed in Grossman and Krueger (1995) and Roberts and Grimes (1997) . 8
Estimating Emissions Requirements in Techniques
The unit emissions requirement, a c z , represents the amount of CO 2 emissions required to produce one unit of net output value in industrial sector (z) in country c.
Previous studies have implemented the assumption that industry-specific production techniques are identical by using a cross-sectional regression of emissions requirements on industry-specific dummy variables. Country-specific deviations from industryspecific emissions techniques appear in the regression as residuals. Following this methodology we use weighted least squares to estimate the following equation, 9
(1)
in which a z c is industry z's emissions per unit value of output, and the industry-specific emissions intensity parameter α 1z is estimated as industry z's dummy variable coefficient.
A large number of studies in the trade literature (e.g., Bowen, Leamer, and Sveikauskas, 1987; Trefler, 1995; Davis and Weinstein, 2001) , have documented that the standard HOV empirical model performs poorly unless it is modified to take account of efficiency differences across countries. Those efficiency differences are sometimes modeled as factor-specific (e.g., Trefler, 1993; Maskus and Nishioka, 2009 ). To incorporate efficiency into the estimation, we estimate the equation Here, θ 2 c is country c's efficiency level (estimated as a country-specific dummy variable coefficient), and the industry-specific dummy variable coefficient α 2z corresponds to the emissions requirement for industry z after adjusting country-specific efficiency 8
For a survey of the environmental Kuznets curve literature, see Dinda (2004) and Stern (2004) . Harbaugh, Levinson, and Wilson (2002) and Bertinelli and Strobl (2005) , for example, found little support for this hypothesis.
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We use the weights proposed by Davis and Weinstein (2001) , which control for heteroskedasticity due to smaller measurement error variance associated with larger factor shares and higher industry output. Estimation using OLS with robust standard errors provides substantially similar results.
differences. It is convenient to normalize efficiency differences to the United States, so
Because the aggregated data indicate a weakly nonlinear relationship between emissions-intensity and country capital-to-labor ratio (see figure 2-2), we also estimate a version of equation (2) that takes account of this relationship as a quadratic function:
Given the positive relationship between capital-intensity and income, if the environmental Kuznets curve is an inverted U-shape, we would expect γ 1 >0 and γ 2 <0. Table 2 presents estimates of θ c from equations (2) and (3), along with estimates of γ 1 and γ 2 from equation (3) and diagnostic statistics from all three regressions. Values less than zero indicate that a country uses cleaner production techniques than the United States. Schwarz (SIC) and Akaike (AIC) statistics support adding variables to control for country-specific efficiency differences, as in equations (2) and (3). The signs of the capital to labor ratio coefficient estimates γ 1 and γ 2 in equation (3) are as expected, but statistically insignificant at the 5% level. Inclusion of the capital to labor ratio appears to add little information, since the country-specific efficiency coefficient estimates θ 2 c and θ 3 c in equations (2) and (3) (2). According to these estimates, iron and steel, chemicals, non-metallic mineral products (e.g., cements), and electricity are the four most emissions-intensive industries, while most service industries are less emissions-intensive.
The relatively low emissions-intensity estimates of transportation sectors are somewhat misleading since liquid fuels used for transportation are not included in our measure. The iron and steel industry's highest ranking in emissions intensity is based on both its electricity usage and its direct-fuel-combustion.
4) Estimating the Emissions Content of Global Trade
With estimates of the emissions intensity of production in hand we can proceed to analyze the reasons for cross-country differences in emissions intensity, and by extension we can shed some light on some recurring questions about the relationship between trade and the environment. It is common in the literature (e.g., Grossman and Krueger, 1991) to distinguish among three effects of increased trade and development on the environment. First, the "scale effect" is the increase in emissions resulting from economic growth, which often accompanies increased trade. Second, the "technique effect" refers to the changing techniques of production that might occur as a country develops, in part as a spillover from international trade or technology transfers. Finally, the "composition effect" is the specialization in emissions-intensive industries that is often alleged to be linked to a country's stage of development. The hypothesized tradeinduced shift of polluting industries from high-income countries to less-developed countries is sometimes referred to as "pollution haven" hypothesis. 10 The nature of the composition effect has been the focus of many previous papers (e.g., Copeland and Taylor, 1995; Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor, 2001; Cole and Elliott, 2003; Levinson, 2009 ).
Our analysis focuses on modeling and measuring the technique and composition effects. Compared to previous work, our method has the advantage of estimating parameters of the different techniques used in different countries. Building our empirical work upon the theoretical contribution of Copeland and Taylor (1995) , we account for the 10 Lucas, Wheeler, and Hettige (1992) provided evidence that the growth in pollution intensity in developing countries followed a strengthening of pollution regulations in OECD countries. Keller and Levinson (2002) also found evidence for pollution havens. Recent evidence also includes Levinson and Taylor (2008) and Eskeland and Harrison (2003) . Davis and Weinstein (2001) . The data strongly support the latter specification, providing evidence that the technique effect dominates the composition effect in explaining the pattern of emissions content of international trade.
Emissions Content of Trade with Factor Price Equalization
We consider a world economy consisting of C countries and N industries. Since emissions are produced jointly with output in the production process, the final output of a product z can be written as a function of CO 2 emissions (e z ) and labor input 
In Copeland and Taylor (1995) , pollution targets are implemented with a marketable emissions permit system, in which the government of country c sets its own emissions target, each firm purchases the profit-maximizing number of units of pollution permits, and all revenue is distributed back to consumers via lump-sum transfers.
there are no barriers to trade, and that factor endowments are similar so that factor prices (τ and w) are equalized across countries (factor price equalization, FPE), in order to measure the emissions content of global trade.
For each country the net-export vector can be obtained as the difference between net production and final consumption: 
Emissions Content of Trade without Factor Price Equalization
The assumptions of FPE and identical production techniques across countries are contrary to real world experience and create problems for the empirical performance of the HOV model, as has been noted widely in the literature, e.g., Trefler (1993) . Some authors, including Copeland and Taylor (1995) have used the Dornbusch-FischerSamuelson (1980) to relax these assumptions. If factor prices are not equalized, the price of effective labor will tend to be lower relative to emissions prices in skill-abundant developed countries, and higher relative to emissions prices in developing countries. As a result, skill-abundant developed countries export skill-intensive products and import emissions-intensive products in the DFS specification. Davis and Weinstein (2001) introduced a DFS specification in which production techniques vary systematically with countries' factor abundances, and therefore the factor contents of imports and exports must be measured separately using the producer countries' techniques. To implement this model consistent with the Copeland-Taylor model, we retain the assumption of constant returns to scale in the production function but introduce industry-and country-specific factor shares. In particular, we modify the production function to , which includes country-specific emissions 
Measured Emissions Content of Global Trade
To measure the emissions content of trade empirically for equations (5) and (7), we employ the following two equations: We estimate emissions content of trade among the 32 countries in our dataset only, since we do not have data on techniques for the rest of the world. 13 In addition, we use imports from country c' to c (M cc' ) rather than exports from c to c' (X c'c ) to avoid biases 13 Ahmad and Wyckoff (2003) estimated the emissions content of trade for the rest of the world by employing U.S. techniques. Also, the choice of proxies for the techniques can induce significant variation in estimates of emissions trade. Refer to appendix B19 "sensitivity to assumptions for non-IO countries" in Ahmad and Wyckoff (2003) . generated from issues such as transport costs, tariff rates, non-tariff trade restrictions, and the statistical adjustments from Purchasing Power Parity (PPP), exchange rates, etc. Also, aggregate CO 2 emissions trades are balanced within the 32-country subset.
The leading exporter of emissions according to the HOV measure, equation (5'), is China (267 million tons) and the second is Indonesia (63 million tons), followed by India (54 million tons). The leading importer of emissions is the United States (302 million tons) and Japan is second (86 million tons), suggesting at first glance that developing countries specialize in emissions-intensive products and developed countries import these products. Normalizing a country's emissions by country its labor force (L Assessments of emissions intensity based on either equations (5') and (7') may be somewhat misleading, however, because both equations measure emissions content of net exports. Net exports vary with the country's trade balance as well as the emissionsintensity of its imports and exports. Even if its industries were relatively clean, for 14 Since we restrict our data on bilateral exports to all the combinations of 32 countries, a country's sum of bilateral exports from those 32 countries is different from that country's total exports. In particular, Canada trades mostly with the countries in our data (96.8 percent) so its emissions content of net exports tends to be greater than other countries.
example, China's large trade surplus would cause China to rank high among net exporters of emissions because nearly all exports embody some emissions. To get a more complete picture of emissions-intensity of trade, therefore, we adapt some additional measures similar to Ahmad and Wyckoff (2003) and Levinson (2009) 1 is greater than one, then country c's import composition is more emissions-intensive than its domestic production.
Panel I in table 4 shows the results from calculation of equation (8). Surprisingly (but consistent with Levinson, 2009) , the United States' import product mix is cleaner than its domestic production. There is in fact no evidence from equation (8) Results from calculations using equation (9) European countries have the cleanest trading partners (the top 9 countries are from European Union), a result that can be explained in part by the tendency of trade to increase with proximity (see e.g. Bergstrand, 1989) . Asian, North American, and Pacific countries, on the other hand, tend to import from countries using more emissionsintensive techniques. In particular, Japan and the United States import heavily from emissions-intensive developing countries, even though the emissions-intensity of the products they import is low relative to domestic production.
Predictions of Emissions Content of Trade from the HOV and DFS Models
We use standard test procedures to check the performance of trade tests for the HOV and DFS models, as in Bowen, Leamer, and Sveikauskas (1987) , Trefler (1995) , and Davis and Weinstein (2001) . First, a sign test obtains the probability of sign coincidences between measured emissions content of trade, F The DFS measure from equation (7) performs much better than the standard HOV in the diagnostic tests. For the DFS specification, the proportion of correct signs rises sharply to 84.4 percent, the slope of the regression line is much closer to one (0.645), and the trade variance ratio (0.202) increases significantly from 0.064 in the standard HOV model. Figure 4 -2 shows that most of the developed countries, including France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, are all measured to be significant importers of emissions, and most of the developing countries (the Czech Republic, China, India, Korea, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Turkey) are both measured and predicted to be exporters of emissions. Thus, the direction and volume of the emissions trade is well predicted from the HOV model once it is modified according to the DFS specification to allow international differences in emissions techniques.
5) Concluding Remarks
All parties to the negotiations on international policies to address anthropogenic global climate change are sensitive to the distributional impacts of those policies, particularly on their own countries. Economists have at their disposal some analytical tools that are useful for assessing those impacts. In particular, we have used the tools of empirical international trade economics to address some basic questions of whose production and trade are most emissions-intensive, and why. The answers are important to the debate because an increase in the price of emissions will disproportionately affect countries whose production and trade rely upon differences in emissions-intensity. The issue has a special resonance because there is a negative correlation between a country's emissions-intensity and its level of development.
The belief that poorer developing countries gain comparative advantage from their high tolerance for pollution, and are therefore more likely to have emissions-intensive economies is sometimes referred to as the "pollution haven hypothesis." Our empirical findings are consistent with a version of the pollution haven hypothesis in which countries import more emissions (embodied in goods and services) as they develop. Our findings are not, however, consistent with the usual formulation of the pollution haven hypothesis, in which the reason for the greater emissions-intensity of developing countries is the outsourcing of pollution-intensive industries by more developed countries.
That is, our results tend to rule out the hypothesis that developing countries are more pollution-intensive because they specialize in dirtier industries (i.e., the "composition effect").
Instead, our results suggest that technology choice drives the greater emissions intensity of industry in developing countries. Both the HOV and the DFS models allow countries to specialize in specific industrial sectors, so if the increased emissionsintensity of lower-and middle-income countries were a result of specialization in emissions-intensive industries then the HOV model would be able to predict emissionsintensity as well as the DFS model does. Because only the DFS model allows for differences in techniques across countries, and its predictions are both different and more accurate than the HOV model's predictions, our empirical research suggests that differences in emissions intensity must be attributed to differences in country-level technology choice. A toy factory in France, for example, is likely to be cleaner than a toy factory in the Czech Republic, because the French use cleaner techniques in production.
Our finding that cross-country differences in emissions intensity are driven primarily by technology choices suggests that policy makers should emphasize technology transfer as a tool in addressing global climate change. There is hope that policies that encourage development of cleaner technologies (presumably in developed countries) and their implementation worldwide might be able to reduce the overall costs of addressing global climate change. Further research and practical experience are needed to quantify both the costs of technological adjustment and the advisability of government intervention to foster that adjustment, but transferring technology from developed to developing countries should be less costly and less disruptive to developing economies than changing the industries in which they specialize.
Data Appendix A: Allocation of Emissions Among Industries
The sectors included in the IPCC-CRF are energy (93% of world CO 2 emissions in 2000); industrial processes (3.5%), agriculture (0%), waste (0%), and international bunkers (3.5%). 15 Since by far the largest share of CO 2 emissions come from energy, and our interest is in industrial emissions, we concentrate on these two sectors. We denote country c's total emissions from energy as e We allocate emissions from these five energy emissions sub-sectors to our 48 industries using coefficients taken from the input-output tables, as follows. First, the electricity and heat (e c e1 ) sector includes emissions from electricity producers, cogeneration plants, and plants whose primary objective is to supply heat for the public.
Since the electricity generation and distribution sector merely supplies the demand for energy by businesses and households, we allocate the CO 2 emissions from the electricity and heat (e c e1 ) subsector into each industry in proportion to its intermediate spending on electricity. 17 We use the formula (A-1) ( )
These figures are exclusive of land-use change and forestry, which constituted 24% of year 2000 CO 2 emissions.
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Emissions from transportation are excluded from our analysis since country size, geography, composition of transportation and business practices make it difficult to allocate transportation emissions consistently across countries. Emissions from fuel sold to any air or marine vessel engaged in international transport (international bunkers) is excluded from the transportation category (e c e5 ) and reported separately. 17 We exclude intermediate spending under "steam and hot water supply" because data for this sector are not available for most countries. We also use input-output data to allocate CO 2 from the manufacturing and construction subsectors (e c e2 ) into industries. For example, a typical steel production plant uses iron ore and coal as its main raw materials. Its production process generates certain gases as by-products that are used as fuel for furnaces or power generation plants on the premises. 18 Even though these by-product gases are fuels similar or identical to those used in the energy and heat subsector (e c e1 ), the UNFCCC reports emissions intentionally generated from fossil fuel combustion for energy and heat in the sub-sector of manufacturing and construction (e c e2 ). We allocate these emissions to our industrial sectors in proportion to sector purchases of "mining (energy)." 19
Next, we allocate emissions from fugitive emissions (e c e4 ), which comprise gases from leakage or flaring released (intentionally or not) without producing useful energy.
They arise primarily from coal mining and oil and gas production and distribution operations, and include very little CO 2 . Since this sector is especially related to coal and oil production and refining, we allocate fugitive emissions into three sectors, "mining (energy)," "coke and refined petroleum products," and "manufacture of gas" according to their industry outputs. (2) Industry-Level Data for Factor Inputs
Physical Capital
We first develop country-total capital stock by using the perpetual method from real gross fixed capital formation in local currencies (GFCF . We scale these bilateral trade flows so that bilateral industry export totals match those from the I-O tables. Because there is no bilateral trade data available for service industries, we allocate the total service exports for each industry derived from the I-O tables into each of 32 countries by the share of total manufacturing exports. In addition, the World Bank Trade, Production, and Protection database does not report the bilateral trade data for agriculture and mining sectors. Therefore, the bilateral exports of these two sectors are estimated from the bilateral exports of total manufacturing for Argentina, Brazil, China, India, and Indonesia. Mining ( Note 1: t-statistics are based on H 0 : θ c = 0.
Note 2: Equation (2) assumes no diversity in efficiency across countries, so the restriction θ c = 0 for all countries.
Note 3: LR tests reject models (2) and (3) at α = .001 or better. 
